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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, 19-year old Scott Hansen pled guilty to one count
of statutory rape.

He received a unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed

and the court retained jurisdiction. On December 27, 2011, the court relinquished its
retained jurisdiction.
On appeal, Mr. Hansen contends that because he was not given an opportunity
to aliocute, such constituted fundamental error, and his case must be remanded for
resentencing. He further contends that his sentence represents an abuse of the district
court's discretion because, given any view of the facts in this case and Mr. Hansen's
life, a sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, is excessive.

Mr. Hansen also

contends that the fact that the district court relinquished its retained jurisdiction based
on evidence of Mr. Hansen's performance in less than 60 days in the rider program and
without a hearing is patently unreasonable. He further contends that the district court
abused its discretion In failing to reduce his sentence in light of the additional
information submitted In conjunction with Mr. Hansen's Idaho Criminal Rule 35

(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Scott Hansen was born in Spokane, Washington.
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.1.)

(Presentence Investigation

His mother walked out on the family shortly after

Mr. Hansen was born, abandoning him for a life of drugs. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Hansen has
not seen his mother since, although he has made several unsuccessful attempts to
locate her.

(PSI, p.3.)

Mr. Hansen's father married Belinda Kirk, and she was
1

Mr. Hansen's mother figure while he was growing up.
children from a previous relationship.

(PSI, p.62.)

(PSI, pp.3, 62.) Ms. Kirk had
Mr. Hansen felt that he was a

"scapegoat" as he was the youngest child in the household.

(PSI, pp.17, 62.)

Mr. Hansen's father was verbally and physically abusive, and taught Mr. Hansen to fight
by forcing him to fight. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Because of this upbringing, Mr. Hansen was often
in trouble at school for fighting.

(PSI, pp.4-5.)

Financial resources were tight and

Mr. Hansen often went hungry.1 (PSI, p.3.)
When Mr. Hansen was approximately 13 years 01d,2 he was placed in foster care
due to the physical fights between Mr. Hansen and his father, and between Mr. Hansen
and his stepbrother. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Mr. Hansen did have a good relationship with his
uncle,3 Tony, but Uncle Tony committed suicide in 2003, when Mr. Hansen was
approximately 12 years 01d.

4

(pSI, p.63.) Around this time, Mr. Hansen's father was

found to be in possession of a firearm, which was prohibited as he is a convicted felon,5
and he was sent to prison. (PSI, pA.) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hansen committed the
crimes that put him in juvenile corrections in Washington State for two years. (PSI, pA.)
Mr. Hansen was released from juvenile detention on April 14, 2010 (9/19/11 Tr., p.25,
LsA-6), and went to live with his stepmother, Belinda, as his father was at that time

1 Mr. Hansen reported that he would steal food from the family's kitchen because he
didn't get enough food to eat. (PSI, p.3.)
2 It is not clear as to whether Mr. Hansen was placed in foster care at age 13 or age 14.
(PSI, pp.3-4.)
3 They would spend time together collecting firewood and hanging out in the woods.
(PSI, p.63.)
4 Mr. Hansen was not informed of the circumstances of his uncle's death, and even at
the time of the psychosexual and mental health evaluations, believed his uncle was
murdered. (PSI, pp.16, 63.) Only after independent investigation was the psychosexual
evaluator able to discover that he had committed suicide. (PSI, p.63.)
5 Mr. Hansen's father was involved in several robberies before Mr. Hansen was born.
(PSI, pA.)

2

incarcerated.

(PSI, pp.3-4; 9/19/11 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-3.)

Mr. Hansen tried to work as

much as he could to help his stepmother financially; however, their already tenuous
relationship further deteriorated, and she kicked him out of the house less than a month
later for "arguing and not listening."

(PSI, p.3.)

Thereby Mr. Hansen found himself

homeless at age 17. (PSI, p.3.; 9/19/11 Tr., p.30, Ls.10-11.) Fortunately Mr. Hansen
went to church with a friend and met Ronald Tucker, who offered Mr. Hansen a place to
stay. (9/19/11 Tr., p.7, LsA-5, p.29, L.19-p.31, L.2.)
It was while residing at Mr. Tucker's house that Mr. Hansen began dating and
having sexual relationships with the two 13-year old victims in this case.

(pSI, p.29,

Ls.19-21.) Based on this conduct, Mr. Hansen was charged with one count of statutory
rape and one count of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor child.

(R., pp.6-7.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Hansen pled guilty to statutory rape and the lewd
and lascivious conduct charge was dismissed by the prosecution.

(7/21/11 Tr., p.3,

L.22 - pA, L.16; R., ppAO-51, 61.) As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to
recommend a unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, and a retained
jurisdiction. (R., p.51.)
On September 19, 2011, Mr. Hansen was sentenced to two years fixed, plus six
years determinate, for a unified sentence of eight years.

(R., pp.62-63.) The district

court retained jurisdiction for 365 days. (R., p.63.) During sentencing, the district court
and Mr. Hansen's counsel made several references to both Mr. Hansen's right and his
intent to make a statement of allocution (9/19/11 Tr., p.5, L.14 - p.6, L.2); however, he
was never afforded an opportunity to do so. During Mr. Hansen's sentencing hearing,
the court peppered Mr. Hansen with questions about this crime, past crimes, what he
thought his punishment should be, and how he met the witnesses who testified on his

3

behalf.

(9/19/11 Tr., p.17, LA - p.31, L.14.) Then the district court pronounced the

sentence.

(9/19/11 Tr., p.31, L.15 - p.32, L.9.)

The district court did not give

Mr. Hansen the opportunity to offer testimony or allocute in mitigation.
Mr. Hansen received a unified sentence of eight years fixed with two years
determinate, but was placed on a retained jurisdiction and arrived at the North Idaho
Correctional Institution (NICI) on October 17, 2011. (R., pp.63, 67; PSI, p.22.)
While at NICI, Mr. Hansen worked in the kitchen, 30 hours per week. (pSI, p.25.)
Mr. Hansen participated in his assigned Sex Offender Assessment Group but had some
disciplinary issues, and his case manager recommended that the district court relinquish
jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.23-27, 32.) On December 27, 2011, the district court relinquished
jurisdiction without a hearing. (R., pp.69-70.)
Mr. Hansen filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Order
Relinquishing Jurisdiction. (R., pp.72-73.) Mr. Hansen also filed a timely Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. (R., pp.81-82.) Although Mr. Hansen submitted
a supporting affidavit (R., pp.83-85), the motion was denied without a hearing
(R., pp.91-95).

4

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court violate Mr. Hansen's rights of due process when it did not
allow him to allocute before he was sentenced?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
eight years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Hansen following his plea of guilty to
statutory rape?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over
Mr. Hansen?

4.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hansen's Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in light of the additional
information offered in his supporting affidavit?

5

ARGUMENT

I.

By Not Allowing Mr. Hansen To Make A Statement Of Allocution During Sentencing,
The Court Violated Mr. Hansen's Due Process Rights

A.

Introduction
At sentencing, the district court told Mr. Hansen that he would have an

opportunity to make a statement on his own behalf, and Mr. Hansen's counsel advised
the district court that he was prepared to make a statement; however, the court did not
allow Mr. Hansen an opportunity to make a statement. Initially, the district court advised
Mr. Hansen as follows:
THE COURT:
Before I decide what to do in this case, Mr. Hansen, I'll afford
you an opportunity to make a statement on your own behalf or to present to me
any evidence or information in mitigation in an effort to lessen any punishment I
might otherwise impose. You can do that yourself, through your lawyer, through
witnesses, or any combination of the same.
(9/19/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.14-20.)

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hansen's counsel advised the

district court that Mr. Hansen had prepared such a statement: "I know that my client
does have a statement ... " (9/19/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2.)
Mr. Hansen's counsel called three witnesses and presented argument. (9/19/11
Tr., p.6, L.3 - p.26, L.6.)

The district court posed several questions to Mr. Hansen

during his counsel's argument (9/19/11 Tr., p.17, LA - p.21, L.7, p.25, LsA-6), asked
the State what it recommended (9/19/11 Tr., p.26, L.7), posed several more questions
to Mr. Hansen (9/19/11 Tr., p.28, L.12 - p.31, L.14), then pronounced its sentence
(9/19/11 Tr., p.31, L.15 - p.33, L.1). Not once did the district court ask Mr. Hansen if he
would like to make a statement on his own behalf prior to pronouncing Mr. Hansen's
sentence. This was error, and a denial of Mr. Hansen's right to due process.

6

Before the imposition of sentence, a criminal defendant is entitled to the full
opportunity to personally address the court before sentencing in an attempt to mitigate
punishment.

I.C.R. 33(a)(1 )6; State v. Garey, 122 Idaho 382, 386 (Ct. App. 1992). This

is because "[s]entencing is a critical stage of the criminal process to which
Constitutional due process guarantees apply." Boardman v. Estelfe, 957 F.2d 1523,
1525 (9 th Cir. 1992).

Where a defendant is denied the opportunity to allocute, the

proper corrective action is to remand to permit resentencing after the defendant is
granted the right to speak. State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 479 (1976); Van Hook v.

us., 365 U.S. 609 (1961).
Even though Mr. Hansen did not object at the sentencing hearing, this Court is
able to review the issue as fundamental error, pursuant to State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 226 (2010). To show fundamental error, the defendant must demonstrate that the
alleged error:

"( 1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional

rights; (2) the error is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any additional
information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) the error affected the outcome
of the trial proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 228; State v. Gorbus, 151 Idaho 368, 371
(Ct. App. 2011), rev. denied. The record in this case demonstrates that the imposition
of sentence was a fundamental error under the Perry test.

6

Idaho Criminal Rule 33(a) requires:
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford counsel an opportunity to speak
on behalf of the defendant and shall address the defendant personally to ask if
the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment.

I.C.R. 33(a).
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B.

The Sentence Was Imposed In
Constitutional Due Process Rights

Violation

Of

Mr.

Hansen's

Unwaived

The Idaho Court of Appeals, pre-Perry, recognized that the right of allocution was
so important a right that a court's failure to allow a defendant to allocute constituted a
fundamental error that could be reviewed for the first time on appeal. State v. Gervasi,
138 Idaho 813 (Ct. App. 2003). The right of allocution holds a time-honored place in
American jurisprudence and is grounded in the fundamental truth that even the "most
persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might,
with halting eloquence, speak for himself." Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304
(1961). The record is clear that the district court did not allow Mr. Hansen a chance to
speak. Mr. Hansen had the right to make a statement on his own behalf.
The right of allocution is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. See State v.
Nez, 130 Idaho 950, 958 (Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing "the constitutional importance of

the right of allocution"). In Boardman, the Ninth Circuit addressed the constitutional
underpinnings of the right, stating:
Recognizing the personal nature of the 6 th Amendment's guarantee of the right to
make a defense, the unique ability of a defendant to plead on his own behalf, and
the Supreme Court's acknowledgment of the continuing vitality of the practice of
permitting a defendant to allocute before sentencing, we hold that allocution is a
right guaranteed by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Boardman, 957 F.2d at 1529-1530.

7

The purpose of allocution is to allow defendants an opportunity to mitigate their
punishment.

Goodrich, 97 Idaho at 479-80. Offering only defense counsel the right to

speak on behalf of the accused does not constitute compliance with this rule. Id. at 480.

The Ninth Circuit, in Boardman, limited its holding to those times when the defendant
makes a request to speak to the trial court before sentencing; however, in Gervasi, the
Idaho Court of Appeals noted that, "states are free to provide greater protections than
those afforded at the federal level." Gervasi, at 816.
7

8

This rule provides the defendant "the absolute right to speak on his or her own behalf at
sentencing." Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 591 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Clark, 146
Idaho 483, 484 (Ct. App. 2008).

Failure to allow the defendant to speak may be

challenged on appeal as fundamental error. Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816.
In Gervasi, a case decided prior to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Perry,
the Court of Appeals looked at (as a matter of first impression) whether a claim of error
based on a denial of allocution must be preserved by objection at sentencing. Id. at
815.

The Court held that even in the absence of an objection at sentencing, a

defendant claiming a denial of the right of allocution may raise the claim either in a
timely filed Rule 35 motion for correction of sentence imposed in an illegal manner, or
for the first time in a timely filed appeal from the judgment and sentence.

Id. at 816.

The Court found that the proper remedy, should the defendant's right to allocute be
denied, is a remand to the district court for resentencing. Id. at 817.
In this case, Mr. Hansen was told prior to being sentenced that he would have an
opportunity to make a statement on his own behalf, his counsel advised the district court
that Mr. Hansen had prepared such a statement, and, although the district court posed
several questions to Mr. Hansen during his counsel's argument, not once did the court
ask Mr. Hansen if he would like to make a statement prior to pronouncing Mr. Hansen's
sentence.
Due to the district court's failure to allow Mr. Hansen to allocute at his sentencing
hearing, Mr. Hansen was deprived of his right to due process of law guaranteed by the
constitutions of the United States and the State of Idaho. As such, the sentence
violated Mr. Hansen's unwaived constitutional right to due process. See Gervasi. Thus,
the first prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.

9

C.

The Violation Of Mr. Hansen's Constitutional Rights Is Clear And Obvious From
The Record
As discussed in Section I(B), supra, the district court imposed sentence without

first allowing Mr. Hansen an opportunity to allocute.

(9/19/11 Tr., p.31, L.15 - p.32,

L.9.) As such, the district court's violation of those rights is clear from the record. This
is because, as the Court of Appeals has held, "Rule 33 states that the court must 'ask if
the defendant wishes to make a statement,' and must do this before sentencing."
Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 817.

"Further, it is not incumbent upon the defendant to

personally interrupt, and potentially embarrass or annoy, the judge who will be
sentencing him." Id. Thus Mr. Hansen was not required to interrupt the district court
during his sentencing to affirmatively assert his rights. Further, this was not a tactical
decision by Mr. Hansen's counsel. Mr. Hansen's counsel had advised the district court
at the outset that Mr. Hansen wished to make a statement. (9/19/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2.)
The district court's failure to allow Mr. Hansen to allocute is a clear and obvious violation
of his rights. As such, the second prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho
at 228.

D.

The District Court's Error Presumably Affected The Outcome Of The Case
Because Mr. Hansen may have received a more excessive sentence because he

could not offer testimony in allocution, the violation of his rights likely affected the
outcome of his case as even the "most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for
a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself." Green,
365 U.S. at 304.
Further, as will be discussed in more depth in Section II, infra, had the district
court engaged in a proper sentencing determination, including proper consideration of
10

all of the mitigating factors present in Mr. Hansen's case, a more lenient sentence may
have been imposed. 8 The record is clear that Mr. Hansen was prepared to make a
statement that day. Although it is impossible to know precisely what Mr. Hansen would
have said, it is likely that he would have offered mitigating testimony and demonstrated
remorse for his crime. After hearing such testimony, the district court would have then
applied the factors for sentencing under I.C. § 19-2521.

The additional facts and

observations that Mr. Hansen should have been allowed to set forth may have changed
the district court's determination of the appropriate sentence for Mr. Hansen. Thus, the
third prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.
Because the district court committed a fundamental error and failed to allow
Mr. Hansen an opportunity to allocute, this Court should vacate his sentence and
remand his case for a new sentencing hearing.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Eight
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Hansen Following His Plea Of Guilty To
Statutory Rape
Mr. Hansen asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of eight
years, with two years fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the

sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).

For example, one of the mitigating factors was Mr. Hansen's youthful age and noted
immaturity. (PSI, pp.1, 30.)

8
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Hansen does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse
of discretion, Mr. Hansen must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id.

The governing criteria or

objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
Mr. Hansen asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the mitigating
factors that exist in his case. From the outset, one of the most striking facts regarding
Mr. Hansen is his youth at the time of the alleged offense - he was barely out of his own
childhood at about eighteen years and ten months of age. (PSI, p.1.) Although by law,
Mr. Hansen was technically an adult, his youth coupled with a troubled childhood, noted
immaturity, and mental health issues show that Mr. Hansen was still in many ways more
a child than a man at the time of his offense.
It would appear that Mr. Hansen was, himself, a victim of abuse as a child. (PSI,
pp.3-4.)

The result of that abuse was that Mr. Hansen had various disciplinary

problems at home and in school, typically involving fighting. (PSI, pp.3-5.) Mr. Hansen
generally suffered from a dysfunctional family life as, beginning around age 11,
Mr. Hansen was shuffled around to family members, a foster home, and juvenile

12

detention. 9 (PSI, pp.3-6.) Mr. Hansen recognized that the lack of family support and
"bad family relationships" were problem areas that contributed to his criminal behavior.
(PSI, p.6.)
Adding to the impact of a tumultuous and abusive childhood, Mr. Hansen also
suffers from serious underlying mental health conditions.

The Idaho Supreme Court

has recently recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to consider a
defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581
(1999). When he was a child, Mr. Hansen was suicidal and made several attempts on
his own life. (PSI, p.5.) Mr. Hansen attempted suicide several times, beginning at the
tender age of six, when Mr. Hansen tried to shoot himself with a rifle but was
unsuccessful because he put the wrong bullet in the gun, which caused it to jam. (PSI,
p.5.) Two more attempts were made by Mr. Hansen when he was eleven years old-he
jumped out of a tree in an attempt to break his neck, then he attempted to suffocate
himself by tying a bag over his head. (PSI, pp.5, 16.) Mr. Hansen began self-injuring at
this time by making little cut marks on himself to make himself feel better. (PSI, p.16.)
Mr. Hansen has been medicated in the past for ADHD.

(PSI, pp.3, 5, 16.)

While

incarcerated in the juvenile corrections facility, Mr. Hansen was placed in housing for
those juveniles with mental health issues.

PSI, p.16.)

Mr. Hansen's past diagnoses

include Major Depressive Disorder and Borderline Intellectual Functioning. (PSI, p.16.)
Mr. Hansen was evaluated by a licensed professional counselor prior to sentencing, and
was found to have a mental illness-Personality Disorder, NOS, with antisocial,
borderline and narcissistic traits. (PSI, p.20.)

The district court concluded that Mr. Hansen had a "lousy upbringing." (9/19/11 Tr.,
p.33, Ls.18-19.)
9
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In addition, Mr. Hansen has a minimal prior criminal record - with only two
juvenile adjudications comprising his entire criminal history. (PSI, p.3, 6.) This absence
of a lengthy criminal history, coupled with Mr. Hansen's youth at the time of the alleged
offense, shows that Mr. Hansen has great potential for rehabilitation in the future.
Mr. Hansen also asserts that the district court did not give proper consideration to
his support in the community.

In State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the

Idaho Supreme Court noted that family and friend support were factors that should be
considered in the Court's decision as to what is an appropriate sentence. Id.
Three members of the community testified for Mr. Hansen at his sentencing
hearing:
L.24.)

Ronald Tucker, James Hines and Jean Hines.

(9/19/11 Tr., p.6, L.9 - 15,

Mr. Tucker, Mr. Hansen's landlord, testified that Mr. Hansen had been

participating in the 12-step Celebrate Recovery program for the House of the Lord
Church when he was arrested.

(9/19/11 Tr., p.7, Ls.7-11, p.30, Ls.7-8.)

Mr. Tucker

said that in the two months Mr. Hansen had been participating, he had noticed positive
changes in Mr. Hansen, which included a different outlook on life and a new "calmness
about him." (9/19/11 Tr., p.7, L. 7 - p.8, L.7.) While residing at the home of Mr. Tucker,
Mr. Hansen worked for Mr. and Mrs. Hines. (9/19/11 Tr., p.9, Ls.21-24, p.14, Ls.6-7.)
His work for them so impressed the Hines' that they attended the sentencing, where
they spoke of Mr. Hansen's potential to be rehabilitated. (9/19/11 Tr., p.8, L21 - p.15,
L.13.) Mr. Hines found Mr. Hansen to be a hard worker; a good kid who was polite and
eager to learn. (9/19/11 Tr., p.9, L.25 - p.1 0, L.2.)
needs leadership and structure.

Mr. Hines noted that Mr. Hansen

(9/19/11 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-3.)

His wife, Jean Hines,

agreed; she testified that Mr. Hansen wants to be part of a family-he wants guidance
and normalcy. (9/19/11 Tr., p.14, Ls16-18.) Mr. Hines testified that Mr. Hansen had
14

accepted responsibility for his actions and that prison was not the right environment for
him. (9/19/11 Tr., p.10, Ls.19-25.)
Mr. Hansen has the support of members of the community-people like
Mr. Tucker and the Hines's want to help Mr. Hansen, because they believe in him.
Admittedly, Mr. Hansen does not have a large supportive family to lean on, but he does
have one family member who is still supportive of him-his grandmother. 1o They have a
strong relationship and Mr. Hansen believes she may take him in after he is released
from prison. (PSI, pA.)
The psychosexual evaluator noted that Mr. Hansen was emotionally younger
than his chronological age and therefore associated with younger peers. (PSI, p.67.)
The Sex Offender Risk Assessment by the Department of Corrections also noted that
Mr. Hansen was immature for his age. (PSI, p.30.) Mr. Hansen's immaturity is clearly
highlighted in his account of the crime. He describes his relationships with both girls as
if he and the two victims were peers. They were "hanging out" and "liking each other."
(PSI, p.2.)

"We weren't dating techinacally (sic) but we were in a way because we

acted like it and stayed loyal to each other ... I noticed that [she] showed that she liked
me more then just a friend, so I made the first 'move' and we kissed." (PSI, p. 2.) This
account is not the tale of a sexual predator, but a story of an immature 18-year old,
functioning at an emotional level much younger than his chronological age, who wrongly

10 Previously, Mr. Hansen was estranged from his grandmother, but with the help of the
foster family he lived with when he was 13 or 14 years old, he was able to contact his
grandmother and re-establish their relationship. (PSI, pA.) Although Mr. Hansen and
his grandmother were close until he was 8-years old, around this time his father
intervened (for unknown reasons) and tried to keep Mr. Hansen from having a
relationship with his grandmother from that point onward. (PSI, pA.)
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believed that having a 13 or 14-year old girlfriend was appropriate. 11 Clearly this is not
acceptable behavior under the law and Mr. Hansen was convicted of statutory rape for
his sexual contact with one girl. Mr. Hansen knows that he made a serious mistake, but
the fact remains that the district court dealt harshly with an immature kid.
Mr. Hansen is not a hardened criminal. Yes, he did have a prior juvenile history.
However, it is clear from the record that he is a very young man, immature for his age,
and quite impressionable. For example, when the district court told him at sentencing
that he "didn't get it,,12, Mr. Hansen agreed and parroted back to the court that he "didn't
get it," simply because that is what the judge told him.

(9/19/11 Tr., p.28, LsA-24.)

Presumably, Mr. Hansen did not intend to be disrespectful, he probably saw the court
as an authority figure and believed that the judge knew what was best, even when he
disagreed with him. Prison is not the appropriate placement for Mr. Hansen, based on
his young age, immaturity, and his ready deference to anyone he sees as an authority
figure.
Additionally, Mr. Hansen has expressed his remorse for committing the instant
offense. In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals
reduced the sentence imposed "[i]n light of Alberts' expression of remorse for his

11 Mr. Hansen's distorted thinking regarding appropriate sexual behaviors for 13 to 14year olds may be based in part on his own experiences-Mr. Hansen lost his virginity at
the age of 11 to a 16-year old girl. (PSI, p. 2.) Although the district court inquired as to
whether Mr. Hansen felt he had been sexually molested (9/19/11 Tr., p.18, Ls.1-12), the
behavior Mr. Hansen was being sentenced for also constituted seemingly "consensual"
sexual relationships with 13-year old girls. While this does not excuse Mr. Hansen's
conduct, it does explain his convoluted thinking about the appropriate age for sexual
encounters and "consent."
12 The district court was referring to a hypothetical situation in which the three witnesses
who testified on Mr. Hansen's behalf had hypothetically had 11 to 13-year old daughters
or granddaughters, they would not want Mr. Hansen to come to their houses when they
were not home. (9/19/11 Tr., p.28, LsA-11.)
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conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other
positive attributes of his character." !d. 121 Idaho at 204. Mr. Hansen has expressed
his remorse for committing the instant offense, both to his counsel and to the presentence investigator. 13 (9/19/11 Tr., 26, L.1; PSI, p.6.)
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Hansen asserts that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts
that had the district court properly considered his community support, remorse, desire
for treatment, and mental health issues, it would have imposed a less severe sentence.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Hansen
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must
evaluate whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.

State v.

Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001). 'The decision to place a defendant on probation or
whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the
sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an
abuse of that discretion."

State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-289 (Ct. App. 2010).

Upon review of a sentence following a period of retained jurisdiction, this Court reviews
the entire record, encompassing events both before and after the original judgment. Id.
at 289.

13 Mr. Hansen did not express remorse at his sentencing as he was not allowed an
allocution. (See generally 9/19/11 Tr.)
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Mr. Hansen contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing
jurisdiction in light of his limited successes during his period of retained jurisdiction, his
recognition of a problem, and his desire to move on to a more successful future.
Mr. Hansen recognizes that his period of retained jurisdiction was not as
successful as desired. However, he did have some limited successes during the period
of retained jurisdiction. There were several positive notes in his file. (pSI, pp.33, 3536.) Mr. Hansen volunteered to help with meal clean-up. (PSI, p.36.) Mr. Hansen also
performed admirably in his work as a breakfast cook. (PSI, pp.35-36.)
Based upon the above information, Mr. Hansen contends the district court
abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction.
In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court
that demonstrates Mr. Hansen's significant rehabilitative potential, as well as his limited
successes while on his rider, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to sua
sponte reduce Mr. Hansen's sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, upon
relinquishing jurisdiction over his case.

IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hansen's Rule 35 Motion
For A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of The Additional Information Offered in
Mr. Hansen's Supporting Affidavit
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).

"The criteria for examining rulings denying the

requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
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the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
Although Mr. Hansen contends that his sentence is excessive In light of the
information in front of the district court at the time of his September 19, 2011 sentencing
hearing (see Part II, supra), he asserts that the excessiveness of his sentence is even
more apparent in light of the new information submitted in conjunction with his Rule 35
motion. Mr. Hansen asserts that the district court's denial of his motion for a sentence
modification represents an abuse of discretion.
In support of his motion for a sentence reduction, Mr. Hansen submitted an
affidavit containing information regarding his time in custody.

(R., pp.83-85.)

Mr. Hansen acknowledged that he made some bad decisions on the rider program, but
also stated that he does care and he does want to change.

(R., p.84.)

Further,

Mr. Hansen expressed remorse for his crime, and, using the skills and information
obtained during his programming at NICI, he has realized the extent of the harm his
actions caused to the victims.

(R., p.84-85.)

This demonstrates that Mr. Hansen is

actively putting to use the information he learned from the classes at NICI.

He is trying

to use this information to better himself.
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district
court at the time of sentencing, it is clear that the district court abused its discretion in
failing to reduce Mr. Hansen's sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Hansen respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district
court for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his
sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 21 st day of August, 2012.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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